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The	effect	on	foreign	multinationals:	an	under-
explored	aspect	of	Brexit
While	most	of	the	studies	on	Brexit	have	focused	on	its	trade	effects,	very	few	have	analysed
the	likely	impact	on	foreign	multinationals.	Claudia	Fernández-Pacheco	Theurer	(Universidad
Autonoma	de	Madrid),	Jose	Luis	López	Ruiz	and	María	C.	Latorre	(Universidad
Complutense	de	Madrid,	left)	argue	that	this	is	an	important	omission.	They	show	how	data	on
trade	and	foreign	multinationals	affiliates’	sales	underlines	the	different	relationship	between	the
UK	and	EU-27	on	both	fronts.	They	go	on	to	explain	the	EU	trade	and	investment	regulatory
regimes	and	analyse	a	few	studies	of	Brexit,	including	its	effect	on	multinationals.
Data	on	trade	and	foreign	multinationals’	affiliates
Trade	relationships	between	the	UK	and	the	EU-27	are	much	stronger	than	the	ties	created	by	their	foreign	affiliates’
sales.	The	EU-27	accounts	for	53.1%	and	44.5%	of	total	UK’s	imports	and	exports,	respectively,	in	2017.	By
contrast,	the	EU-27	accounts	for	36.6%	of	total	foreign	affiliate	sales	in	the	UK	(12.8%	of	total	sales	within	the	UK),
while	the	UK’s	foreign	affiliate	sales	in	the	EU-27	account	for	25%	of	total	UK’s	foreign	affiliate	sales	abroad	in	2015.
This	has	been	a	common	trend	in	the	last	years	(Figures	1	and	2).
Figure	1.	UK’s	exports	to	the	EU-27	over	total	UK’s	exports	and	UK’s	foreign	affiliate	sales	in	the	EU-27	over	total
UK’s	foreign	affiliate	abroad	(in	percentages)
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Source:	Updated	from	Fernández-Pacheco	et	al.	(2018)	©	Emerald
Figure	1	shows	that	the	EU-27	has	lost	importance	as	an	investment	destination	for	the	UK,	although	the	shares
(around	25%)	in	2014	and	2015	are	still	considerable.	By	contrast,	the	EU-27	is	crucial	for	the	UK’s	exports,	which
are	always	well	beyond	40%.	Note	that	the	UK’s	foreign	affiliate	sales	and	the	UK’s	exports	represent	two	different
forms	of	provision	of	UK	products	in	foreign	markets.
Figure	2.	UK’s	imports	from	the	EU-27	over	total	UK’s	imports	and	EU-27’s	foreign	affiliate	sales	in	UK	over	total
foreign	affiliate	sales	in	the	UK	(in	percentages)
LSE Brexit: The effect on foreign multinationals: an under-explored aspect of Brexit Page 2 of 7
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-10-22
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/10/22/the-effect-on-foreign-multinationals-an-under-explored-aspect-of-brexit/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
Source:	Updated	from	Fernández-Pacheco	et	al.	(2018)	©	Emerald
In	Figure	2	we	see	the	share	in	the	UK’s	imports	from	the	EU-27	has	been	much	larger	than	the	share	of	EU-27’s
foreign	affiliate	sales	in	total	foreign	affiliates	operating	in	the	UK	since	2008.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the
operations	of	foreign	affiliates	in	the	UK	are	of	great	relevance.
Figure	3	makes	clear	that	the	share	of	total	(EU-27	and	non-EU-27)	foreign	affiliates	in	UK	stands	out	with	37.4%,
compared	to	other	large	economies,	such	as	Germany	(22.7	per	cent),	Spain	(27.2%),	France	(20.4%)	or	Italy
(18.1%)	and	also	compared	to	the	average	of	the	EU-28	(28.6%)	in	2014.
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Fernández-Pacheco	et	al.	(2018)	show	the	shares	of	the	top	15	UK	trade	and	investment	partners,	of	which	the	US
is	the	main	one	in	investment,	apart	from	a	key	trade	partner.	The	US	is	the	first	destination	of	the	UK’s	exports
(18.2%	in	2014)	and	second	main	importing	source	(with	11.9%	of	total	UK	imports	following	Germany,	which
accounts	for	13.5%	of	them,	in	2014).	The	US	accounts	for	30.3%	of	total	UK	foreign	affiliates	abroad	and	26.5%	of
total	foreign	affiliates	within	the	UK	(in	2014).
Figure	3.	Shares	of	national	firms	and	foreign	affiliates	in	total	sales	by	EU	country	(%)
Source:	Fernández-Pacheco	et	al.	(2018)	©	Emerald
The	EU	foreign	trade	and	investment	legislative	regime
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While	foreign	trade	policies	have,	since	the	Treaty	of	Rome	(1957),	been	the	exclusive	competence	of	the	European
Commission,	investment	policies	with	third	countries	have	been	completely	in	the	hands	of	EU	sovereign	states.
However,	after	the	entry	into	force	of	the	2009	Lisbon	Treaty,	foreign	investment	policies	will	also	be	transferred	to
the	European	Commission.	The	implementation	of	this	new	regime	will	take	some	time	and	its	exact	scope	and
content	still	remains	a	controversial	issue	(Fernández-Pacheco	et	al.,	2018).	But	it	seems	that	the	UK	will	be	able	to
continue	its	investment	policies	as	it	wishes,	contrary	to	the	situation	in	other	EU	member	states.	Nevertheless,	the
UK’s	leveraging	power	will	be	reduced	outside	the	EU.
Photo:	George	via	a	CC-BY-NC-SA	2.0	licence
In	the	past,	EU	members	regulated	their	investment	with	third	countries	through	the	so	called	Bilateral	Investment
Treaties	(BITs).	The	UK	has	signed	over	1000	BITs	since	1975.	What	is	going	to	happen	to	them	after	Brexit?	In
principle,	they	will	remain	valid	(Molinonuevo,	2017).	As	the	UK	negotiated	and	signed	them	in	its	own	capacity	and
independently	of	the	EU,	Britain’s	separation	from	the	EU	should	not	necessarily	have	any	direct	legal	effect	on
these	treaties.	However,	Brexit	will	mean	that	the	UK-based	ﬁrms,	including	foreign-owned	ﬁrms,	will	no	longer
beneﬁt	from	the	UK’s	access	to	the	EU	single	market,	which	has	the	tiniest	possible	barriers	between	different
countries	to	exist	globally.	Thus,	third	countries	may	seek	some	form	of	compensation.	What	is	more,	amendments
to	BITs	would	be	possible	even	if	those	treaties	do	not	expressly	address	this	possibility	by	invoking	the	rebus	sic
stantibus	doctrine	of	international	law,	which	allows	for	a	termination	of	an	international	agreement	because	of	a
fundamental	change	of	circumstances	(Molinonuevo,	2017).
Brexit	studies	including	multinationals
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In	Fernández-Pacheco	et	al.	(2018)	we	explain	in	depth	why	modelling	foreign	investment	is	challenging,	and		the
problems	with	the	data.	Given	these	difficulties,	we	should	be	prudent	regarding	the	effects	on	multinationals	after
Brexit.	However,	a	few	studies	suggest	it	is	hard	to	overcome	the	negative	impact	of	trade	with	multinationals’
operations.	Latorre	et	al.	(2018a)	calculate	the	emergence	of	barriers	to	foreign	affiliate	sales	in	services	sectors
would	account	for	one	third	of	the	overall	negative	impact	of	Brexit,	with	the	remaining	negative	two	thirds	being
explained	by	trade.	To	be	more	specific,	in	Latorre	et	al.	(2018a)	a	hard	(soft)	Brexit	would	lead	to	a	total	decrease	in
UK’s	GDP	of	-2.53%	(-1.23%),	while	the	foreign	affiliates’	component	alone	would	cause	a	reduction	of	-0.83%	(-
0.41%).	By	contrast,	Ciuriak	et	al.,	(2015,	Table	2,	p.	14)	obtain	a	negligible	impact	from	multinationals	effects	after
Brexit,	although	Brexit	will	continue	to	be	quite	harmful	for	the	UK.	According	to	Latorre	et	al.	(2018b)	a	UK-US	deep
trade	and	FDI	agreement	would	be	far	from	compensating	the	harmful	effects	of	Brexit.	They	further	explore	potential
agreements	with	China,	Japan	and	India	and	find	their	effects	to	be	positive	but	very	small.	Latorre	et	al.	(2018c)
have	also	explored	in	more	detail	the	potential	expansion	of	UK	investments	in	China	and	find	its	impact	will	be	very
limited.	Finally,	Latorre	et	al.	(2018d)	explore	in	more	detail	the	impact	of	foreign	multinationals	operating	in	services
sectors	in	UK	after	Brexit.	They	find	that	the	barriers	to	investment	rise	the	price	of	services	and	also	reduce
production	not	only	in	services	but	also	in	manufacturing.	This	latter	effect	may	be	surprising	–	since	the	barriers	to
investment	affect	only	the	service	sector	directly	–	but	nonetheless	manufacturing	production	is	also	harmed	across
the	board	because	services	provide	important	intermediates	for	manufacturing	sectors.
Conclusions
For	the	UK,	the	EU	is	a	much	less	important	partner	for	investment	than	it	is	for	trade.	The	implementation	of	the
2009	Lisbon	Treaty	implies	that	in	the	future	the	UK	will	be	able	to	continue	with	its	own	investment	policies	after
Brexit,	contrary	to	other	EU	member	states	that	will	share	a	common	investment	regime	similar	to	the	EU’s	common
commercial	policy.	However,	UK’s	negotiation	leverage	will	be	reduced	compared	to	when	it	was	as	a	member	of	the
EU.	Although	modelling	economy-wide	impact	of	multinationals’	affiliates	and	investment	is	challenging	and	there	are
difficulties	with	the	data,	a	few	studies	suggest	that	their	effect	will	not	be	able	to	compensate	for	the	sizeable
negative	impact	of	trade	after	Brexit	–	and	will	even	exacerbate	its	harmful	impact.
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